In contrast, the character-related rationality assumption predicts that not all the dictators who act as if maximizing their implicit utilities would offer nothing, as shown in the following proposition.
In this article, we think this assumption is problematic and, instead, assume that rational economic agents act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, which turns out to be a natural extension of the canonical rationality assumption.
In contrast to the canonical rationality assumption, the idea underlying this transformation is referred to as the character-related rationality assumption; that is, all players are rational economic agents who act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities.
By the character-related rationality assumption that players act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, we may give a more reasonable solution to the Public Goods game defined here.
Hence, fairness is achieved as a natural consequence of two players acting as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, whereas in almost all other existing theoretical models it is incorporated explicitly as one of primitive assumptions about people's instincts related to decision making [10], [22], [26], [27].
Furthermore, there is a growing body of research suggesting that interventions can maximize their effectiveness by targeting implicit-automatic processes underlying stigma (e.g. subconscious biases) [ 74, 75].
Everyone should do that — maximize their time.
But nonprofits exist to maximize their missions.
If both contribute a lot, they maximize their profits.
Don't they know they have to maximize their day?
