Sentence examples for material payoffs and from inspiring English sources

This paper shows that the presence of different types of players – those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions – can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the presence of asymmetric information.

Because players 1 and 4 are maximizing their opponents material payoffs and players 2 and 3 are maximizing their own material payoffs, the group fairness equilibrium of the two-period game is the outcome where the sum of the material payoffs is maximized.

Note that in the outcome that maximizes the sum of the material payoffs when X grows arbitrarily large, players 2 and 3 maximize their own material payoffs, and when indifferent, they maximize their opponents material payoffs, while players 1 and 4 maximize the material payoffs of their opponents.

This condition implies that if both players are exclusively interested in their own material payoffs and if this fact is common knowledge, then the consumer never accepts to be served, causing a breakdown of the market.

Accordingly, the consumerʼs material payoff in case of participation changes to π c − m, while the expertʼs material payoff stays the same (as in Γ B ). 9 Consider game Γ B. Suppose that both parties are rational, risk-neutral and care only for their own material payoffs, and that this is common knowledge.

The reason is that overtreatment reduces the expertʼs material payoff but has no effect on the amount of guilt as it leaves the consumerʼs material payoff and her payoff expectation unaffected.

This formulation says that the DM׳s utility is a linear combination of her own material payoff and the other person׳s material payoff and that the (otherwise constant) weight the DM puts on the other׳s payoff might depend on whether the other is ahead or behind.

Soft factors such as non-binding promises have no effect on market behavior if all players are rational and only interested in their own material payoff, and if this fact is common knowledge.

Because in the outcome that maximizes the sum of the payoffs players 1 and 4 maximize the material payoffs of their opponents and Q X) is a kind-game, both players are kind.

If (lambda _{i}) and (theta _{i}) are positive for every player, when X becomes arbitrarily large, the material payoffs of players 2 and 3 dominate their reciprocal payoffs.

Also note that if X grows arbitrarily large in game Q(X),  the material payoffs of players 2 and 3 dominate their reciprocal payoffs, while the reciprocal payoffs of players 1 and 4 dominate their material payoffs (as no player can change the material payoffs of their partners since they do not play in the same single game).