Logical positivist philosophy of science took up aspects of Cohen's project, including its central concern with mathematics and physics.
Again it can hardly be denied that much logical empiricist philosophy, especially after World War II, was ahistorical in outlook and asocial in its orientation.
But Einstein's theories of relativity provided far more than the subject matter for these philosophical examinations; rather logical empiricist philosophy of science was itself fashioned by lessons allegedly drawn from relativity theory in correcting or rebutting neo-Kantian and Machian perspectives on general methodological and epistemological questions of science.
This conclusion was a cornerstone of two important early movements in analytic philosophy, logical atomism and logical positivism.
Although conceptual analysis, construed decompositionally from the time of Leibniz and Kant, and mediated by the work of Moore, is often viewed as characteristic of analytic philosophy, logical analysis, taken as involving translation into a logical system, is what inaugurated the analytic tradition.
Although they were skeptical about mixing psychology and philosophy, logical empiricists tacitly adopted a simple theory of learning: children can learn terms such as red by being shown appropriate swatches, hot by holding their hands under the right taps, and so forth.
They read much in the writings of the ancients, says Josephus (hence, no doubt, the many scrolls in the caves), yet (Philo) they do not cultivate the logical side of philosophy, do not expend "any superfluous care on examining Greek names" (by which is evidently meant such subtle discussions of words as one gets in the dialogues of Plato), but only occupy themselves with the moral side.
Logical atomism in philosophy and behaviourism in psychology had little to say about the notion.
Of course, these pseudo-theses became known as 'pseudo-object sentences' and their analysis became a centerpiece of Carnap's Logical Syntax-era philosophy (Carnap 1937, Sec. 74).
