Sentence examples for logical objects from inspiring English sources

What is more, Bolzano had an unshakeable intuition that there are and must be such purely logical objects, namely "objective sentences" or "sentences in themselves" (Sätze an sich), and their parts, i.e., "objective ideas" or "ideas in themselves" (Vorstellungen an sich).

These explicit definitions arguably allow Frege to maintain the logicist thesis that arithmetic is logic: they define numbers as logical objects in the sense that their existence can be justified on the basis of (Frege's) logic alone.

The resulting view correspondence as isomorphism between properly analyzed truthbearers and facts avoids assigning strange objects to such phrases as "the average husband", "the sake of", and "the present king of France"; but the view remains committed to logically complex facts and to logical objects corresponding to the logical constants.

We might agree that there must be logical objects of some sort if logic is to have a subject matter, but if Frege is to achieve his goal of showing that our knowledge of arithmetic is free of intuition, then at some point he has to address the question of how, as a matter of meaning, existence claims can be analytic.

But that argument might be turned around by a believer in logical objects, objects whose existence is implied by logic alone.

This paper describes the evolution of these criteria and the results of their use in evaluating four standard terminologies: the Gene Ontology (GO), the NCI Thesaurus (NCIt), the Common Terminology for Adverse Events (known as CTCAE), and the laboratory portion of the Logical Objects, Identifiers, Names and Codes (LOINC).

This process generates the logical object Decision, whose state determines which one of the above three options will be executed.

These verbs such as "increase"–share the semantic characteristics of a state-change in the logical object of the verb, and the syntactic behavior that when they are intransitive, the grammatical subject of the verb is the undergoer of the change (i.e., is the logical object).

Many philosophers have found it hard to believe in the existence of all these funny facts and funny quasi-logical objects.

(In these sections, Frege considers what happens to the definition of 'x is a member of y' when y is not an extension).[17] Even if Frege somehow could have successfully restricted the quantifiers of Gg to avoid the Julius Caesar problem, he would no longer have been able to extend his system to include names of ordinary non-logical objects.

The second question arises because Frege's work offers no general condition under which we can identify an arbitrarily chosen object x with a given number such as the number of planets; how then can Frege claim to have precisely specified which objects the numbers are within the domain of all logical and non-logical objects?