Nobody accuses the language of Pascal and Descartes of being any less logical than English.
When one of these is allowed to dominate, we get a science which is all intuition, all "esprit de finesse," but no logical coherence, namely, English science; or we get a science which is all logic, lacking bon sens, namely, German science.
The computational complexity of determining logical relationships between English sentences featuring the temporal constructions in question is thus established.
Moreover, negatives and quantifiers (i.e., such words as all and every), which in English are logical operators that have scope over syntactically defined phrase structures, have no exact counterparts in languages without well-defined syntactic phrases; such languages must use other devices to express or imply similar concepts.
The framework meets expectations by comparing logical structures originated from English and Persian sentences.
But the linguistic and logical conceptions popular among English-speaking philosophers since World War II may not be well suited to the analysis of emotion.
If propositions are the "things" that really have logical form, and sentences of English are not themselves propositions, then sentences of English "have" logical forms only by association with propositions.
This is a logical solution: everyone, including the English, would then have an assembly.
For instance, Boolos asserts without argument that the translation of each plural comprehension axiom into English "expresses a logical truth if any sentence of English does" (Boolos 1985b, 342 (1678a, 167); his emphasis).
But then he stresses (ibid., 56) that the logical calculi created by the English logicians Augustus De Morgan and George Boole in the middle of the 19th century were completely independent of Leibniz and German 18th-century research on logic.
