Thus, it is by virtue of being in some way related to (i.e., by participating in, or partaking of) the form of beauty that beautiful things (other than beauty) are beautiful, it is by virtue of partaking of the form of largeness that large things are large, and so on.
For instance, change is changing by itself, largeness is large by itself, heat is hot by itself, the one is one by itself.
The associated statements are self-predications of the sort Plato's characters mention in earlier dialogues ("largeness is large," "justice is just;" for self-predications in the Sophist, see 258b c).
So, just as Elsie is completely a cow, so Largeness is completely large: Largeness is a complete bearer of an incomplete property.
Does the statement "Simmias is not large" assert that largeness is different from every attribute Simmias has (manhood, bravery, red-hair, blue-eyes, and so on)? (Keyt 1973 and Brown 2008 call this the "Oxford interpretation").
A social movement is usually large, but, like duration, largeness is only relative.
Since, according to this approach, Plato is seeking a large that is the unqualified bearer of largeness, and since every particular is disqualified in light of compresence, Plato postulates a Form, Largeness Itself, to be the unqualified bearer.
"Different from large," while not meaning the opposite of largeness (the polar contrary smallness), means some size other than largeness (smallness being one possibility among others).
He had a very large head — Annagret couldn't explain it to Andreas, but the largeness of Horst's head seemed to her the reason that everything always worked out to his advantage.
Thus, for example, when you say "Simmias is not large," you indicate that Simmias has some definite size other than largeness, either the polar contrary smallness or some intermediate size.
In the latter case, perhaps he can do without a form of the not-large, because he can explain that feature by appeal to the form of largeness and the form of not-being.
