Their interests turned to epistemological issues when it became apparent that alternative accounts of knowledge and of justification were required "in order to overthrow presuppositions in their disciplines which functioned as obstacles to necessary change" (Longino 1999, 330).
In brief, Hintikka/Kripke style knowledge is knowledge of propositions, but justification terms justify sentences.
The dimensions found are similar to those found in most popular epistemic questionnaires, because the EBAM takes into account aspects of the certainty and stability of knowledge, the justification for knowing, and the source of knowledge.
It should be noted, however, that the presupposition that the structure of knowledge parallels the structure of justification is controversial.
The main point we are trying to make, here, is that there is a long tradition of philosophical thought that deals with these questions of justification, knowledge and truth, and a commitment to any specific empirical bioethics methodology is likely to involve aligning oneself with a particular epistemology about how a claim to moral knowledge can be justified.
We report an experiment on lay attributions of knowledge and justification for a wide range of Gettier Cases and for a related class of controversial cases known as Skeptical Pressure cases, which are also thought by philosophers to elicit intuitive denials of knowledge.
According to virtually all externalists, one can arrive at a justified belief in P by inferring it from E without being aware of any sort of evidential connection between E and P. While the externalist defends radically different views than those of classical foundationalists, the structure of knowledge and justification that emerges from such theories is still often a foundationalist structure.
Perhaps it is because new views about the nature of knowledge and justification hold that they require the use of processes and methods that reliably lead to truth rather than recognizably good reasons.
Causal theories of the basing relation must not be confused with causal theories of knowledge or justification.
So justification has external conditions.[32] The debate over the structure of knowledge and justification is primarily one among those who hold that knowledge requires justification.
