According to the logs, special forces have killed "high value" targets without any attempt to capture them.
The first covert "joint" team involving the CIA and various military special operations forces to work together in Afghanistan was Task Force 5, charged with the mission of capturing or killing "high value targets" like Osama bin Laden, senior leaders of al-Qaeda, and Mullah Mohammed Omar, the head of the Taliban.
In the wake of September 11th, the C.I.A. launched what now seems a comparatively selective effort to capture or kill "high-value targets" associated with Al Qaeda.
Because of the constraints on allied forces, Pentagon officials said, two kinds of missions will remain under a separate American command: running prisons and counterterrorism operations to capture or kill high-value Taliban and Qaeda leaders.
Under his command are all the various "tribes" of American Special Operations forces: Army Green Berets, Navy SEALs and Marine Corps Special Operations units, as well as the top-tier strike teams that hunt down or kill high-value terrorist and insurgent leaders.
The program uses espionage and secretive drone strikes to kill "high-value targets".
Less well known but equally effective in turning the situation around in Iraq were the increased capabilities of Joint Special Operations Command under General Stanley McChrystal, who greatly expanded the campaign to capture or kill high-value targets from the dwindling al Qaeda leadership ranks, including the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Since then, officials said, the C.I.A. has been given the mission of hunting and killing "high-value targets" in Yemen — the leaders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who Obama administration lawyers have determined pose a direct threat to the United States.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter told a news conference that US forces killed Qaduli in Syria, but would not specify if he was killed by an airstrike or by US special operations troops deployed to kill and capture high value Islamic State militants.
