A justification of these premises, of course, does not exist.
If that is so, do you not have a heavy burden of justification?" Every premise of that question was a misperception.
The connection between performing such actions through a wise disposition and success is, Arcesilaus suggests, something that the Stoics can't deny, because they agree that opinion is the cause of error (this is the justification for premise [6] in sect. 3, above).
So our empirical justification for premise 1 is compromised.
If such conflicting beliefs are not justified in the absence of a reason, and if such conflicts are pervasive enough to undermine all non-inferential justification, then premise (2) is true.
But since the justification of that conjunction rests in part on an empirical premise, its justification is empirical, not a priori.
Taking these considerations into account, purely normative, theoretical research on ideal premises (i.e. simplified, limited premises that basically allow for discussion and justification of principles, not real world actions) cannot be characterised as being translational in its own right.
Hence, any such skeptical argument must have a premise stating a necessary condition on the justification of belief.
C-Trans seems to be meant to account formally for transmissivity of first-time and quantitatively strengthening justification, in the senses that any deductive argument with premise p, conclusion q and evidence e is transmissive of justification of either type if and only if it satisfies C-Trans.
What is sought is a way of computing the "on sum" degree of justification of a conclusion in terms of the degrees of justification of all relevant premises and the strengths of all relevant reasons.
