"There is no justification for banning something on the basis that it has been removed by a machine rather than by hand with a knife".
It is a bit of a red herring to suggest that just because it can't be enforced that it is a justification for ignoring something.
Whenever Darwinism is invoked it's usually a justification for doing something mean.
For R would be justification for believing something else — the very thing that, according to EB, is an obstacle to basicality.
The fact that another person is justified in believing a proposition Q doesn't give me justification for believing something implied by Q.
And it is through the causal connection that one can argue that perception provides one with justification for believing something about their environment.
So each of them holds that a belief can be justified by an experiential ground alone, that is, without the subject's having any further justification for believing something in addition to the belief in question.
The concept gives way too easily to an infuriating way of shooting down any argument: simply find someone of the same identity who disagrees (a crude example is the old justification for doing something racist: "I have a non-white friend who says this is OK").
The Conditions Question: suppose that conceivability does provide justification for believing that something is possible.
