For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: it must be justified.[4] There is considerable disagreement among epistemologists concerning what the relevant sort of justification here consists in.
According to Scanlon, a valid method of justification in ethics consists in testing the congruence between theoretical assumptions and intuitive moral judgments, that is, judgments to which we normally accord initial credence.
As we have seen, reliabilists about justification think that justification for a belief consists in a genesis in a reliable cognitive process.
The example of importation shows that not every valid rule has a justification consisting of elementary reductions only.
Inspired by Sellars, BonJour (1978 , 1985 presented the following dilemma for any foundationalist view that takes one's justification to consist in or depend essentially on some sort of awareness, acquaintance, or apprehension.
On Husserl's view, "the crucial further step" in order to answer this question consists in disclosing the dimension that opens up when the epistemic justification, or "motivation", of intersubjective experience, or empathy, is additionally taken into account and made explicit (Husserliana, vol. VII, p. 435).
That is, our justification for our moral beliefs would be defeated by these evolutionary considerations, at least if truth for moral beliefs consists in accurately representing independent moral facts, as realists maintain.
This represents an important feature, because the kinetic model building process consists in an iterative task producing several intermediate versions and plays an important role in understanding the justification for certain parts of a model.
However, injustice in the relational sense entails an unfairness as among persons or groups; injustice in this sense consists in the fact that someone has suffered or benefited but others have not (and there is no adequate justification for this state of affairs).
