Sentence examples for justification can be understood from inspiring English sources

The evolutionary approach to public justification can be understood in terms of what James March calls "adaptive" rationality rather than "calculated" rationality, where rationality is achieved when an agent adapts effectively to her environment regardless of how she does so (March 1978).

These considerations suggest that one aspect of the debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is best understood as a debate about whether knowledge and justification can be understood in naturalistically acceptable causal and reliabilist terms or must be understood in terms of naturalistically suspect evaluative terms.

The demand for justification of such principles can be understood in two importantly distinct ways, corresponding to the distinction between epistemic principles and methodological principles made at the end of Section 1. Justifying an epistemic principle requires answering an epistemic question: why are parsimonious theories more likely to be true?

Notice that "justification" and "reasonableness" are both epistemic notions, or at least can be understood in epistemic senses.

On the one hand, those who understand the evaluation implicit in love to be a matter of the bestowal of value (such as Telfer 1970 71; Friedman 1993; Singer 1994) typically claim that no justification can be given (cf. Section 4.2).

While the principle of Predicative Comprehension can be given a constructive justification, no such justification can be provided for the principle of Extensionality of Functions.

There are several different ways in which this "institutional justification" can be developed.

Biological justification can be found for assuming inheritance of fitness costs varying from recessive to dominant.

The details of the sample size formula and justifications can be found elsewhere [ 18, 19].

Is this to be understood as a fundmental principle about epistemic justification, or is it to be understood as an instance of some more general principle?

The two can overlap, and do overlap when rational justification is understood in an end-directed way that is, where trust is rationally justified because it is instrumentally valuable, or because it serves one's ends.