This finds further support in what Descartes says, for example, in the First Replies: "…the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect — not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e., in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect" (AT VII 102 3; CSM II 75).
In the passage mentioned above we have to clearly understand that Dietrich is trying to say that the intellect reflects all things they shine forth in it, not because the intellect is undergoing an act of divine illumination, but because in the order of ens conceptionale the things are in the intellect first as conceptions and are exemplified there as part of the nature of intellect.
"His whole life was in the intellect," observed a Manhattan Project scientist about its director, Robert J. Oppenheimer, a graduate of the New York School of Ethical Culture.
As stated earlier, Aristotle typically spoke of the form of an object as being in the mind or intellect of the knower and the matter as being outside it.
Such an object is solely in the intellect, "…it is not an actual entity, that is, it is not a being located outside the intellect…" (AT VII 103; CSM II 75) According to this interpretation, Descartes understands the objects represented or presented to the mind, objects that are in some sense in ideas, as intentional (and purely mental) objects.
For him, the active intellect is an integral part of the human soul: "the active intellect is in the soul and it is like the most honourable part of the human soul" (In DA 103.4 5).
Socrates, the man, has vital activities that are the activities of a living animal, like sensation, nutrition, reproduction, and so on, activities that are not distinctive activities of the soul itself as intellect is in the human case.
In the Aristotelian scheme against which Descartes is moving, all knowledge arises from the senses, in accordance with the slogan "There is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" (7:75, 267).
Thus, Locke subscribes to a version of the empiricist axiom that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses — where the senses are broadened to include reflection.
So it is in the perception of objects of intellect theorems, namely that the internal sense of beauty has its raison d'etre, and it is by resembling theorems in point of uniformity that other objects, including material objects, are beautiful.
