So it seems that there is no way to justify a principle that states the conditions sufficient for a priori justification: an attempt at empirical justification would turn rational intuitions into empirical evidence and an attempt at intuitive justification would be circular.
Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the epistemic credentials of intuitions can be defended by appealing to similarities between perceptual justification and intuitive justification or to a general doctrine regarding non-inferential justification.
On the other hand, justification by intuition would be circular since (J) is supposed to give the conditions for intuitive justification.
However, the central problem with it is that there appears to be no intuitive justification for this claim.
As intuitive justification, x is equivalent to S x means that (S_{x} rightarrow x) within some precision δ.
The intuitive justification of inductive definitions is related to the fact that they can be expressed by means of finite rules, in a "bottom-up" way.
These imaginative exercises are meant to call to our attention certain facts ("defeaters") which, once we become aware of them, threaten to undermine our perceptual and intuitive justification for accepting the ordinary conception in the first place.
However, this worry can be assuaged if one recalls that the JTB theory has little or no intuitive justification of its own and was justifiably accepted by its proponents only on the grounds that it provided the best account of our pre-Gettier intuitions.
The scaling predicted here provides an intuitive justification of the Hayflick hypothesis and supports the current view of a small active stem cell pool supported by a large, quiescent reserve.
