I will therefore begin by outlining our intuitive conception of states of affairs.
Much work clearly is being done here by the intuitive conception of "strong analogy" between the reduced theory T′ and the corrected reduced theory T′*.
But Transparency is not the same as Openness, for it is not obvious that (ii) is part of our intuitive conception of experience.
But this shouldn't be at all satisfying to one who wants to defend our intuitive conception of perceptual experience, for two reasons.
(After all, theories in this territory are trying to capture the intuitive conception of justification of ordinary folk. How complex can their conception be? Ceteris paribus, then, simple theories are preferable to more complex ones).
However, this intuitive conception is too inclusive, since it also counts whispering as a speech act even though one can whisper a string of nonsense words without meaning anything.
That's bad enough for our intuitive conception of perceptual experience, but it gets worse: for later we'll see how the arguments can be supplemented so as they support the rejection of Openness too (§3.1).
The potential dispute over whether there is a single precise notion of randomness that answers perfectly to our intuitive conception of random sequence can be largely sidestepped for present purposes.
Central to the brain's remarkable plan-recognition capacity is a theory of mind (ToM): our intuitive conception of other agents' mental states chiefly, beliefs and desires and how they cause behavior.
Glüer & Wikforss (forthcoming) argue that, as long as we are concerned with an intuitive conception of rule-following or rule-guidedness, the possibility of deviant causal chains makes it highly improbable that any true sufficiency claim will be forth-coming along these lines.
