Whether this account helps intuitionists will depend on a more general metaphilosophical debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy, and whether intuitions justify.
Intuition, in philosophy, the power of obtaining knowledge that cannot be acquired either by inference or observation, by reason or experience.
Sosa (2008) argues x-phi results fail to undermine the role of intuition in philosophy, which analogically functions (he suggests) as observation functions in empirical science.
The importance of intuitions in philosophy has been neglected in the past (see Williamson, 2004b, p. 109 110), and only recently intuition received some of the attention it deserves (see, e.g., DePaul; Ramsey (eds)., 1998).
Another approach that discounts the role of intuitions in philosophy, especially in epistemology, is pragmatic.
There are other objections to the reliance on intuitions in philosophy that do not call into question their reliability.
As noted in §1, the focus of the present entry is the role of intuitions in philosophy.
While there is an extensive contemporary debate about the importance of intuitions in philosophy (DePaul and Ramsey 1998; Knobe and Nicholls 2008; Pust 2014; Cappelen 2012), this question is surprisingly little asked.[15] No doubt this is a result of Quine's doubts about the analytic-synthetic distinction.
It comes as no surprise that Tait has little use for Gödelian appeals to mathematical intuition in the philosophy of mathematics, or for the philosophical thesis that mathematical objects exist "outside space and time".
Once one moves beyond the large-scale debates between Cartesian dualism and Skinnerian behaviourism to consider indefinitely complex functionalist proposals about inner organization, many of the standard arguments and intuitions of traditional philosophy may no longer seem decisive.
