'internal minds' is not a correct or usable part of a sentence in written English.
Instead, you could use the phrase 'inner thoughts'. Example sentence: I could feel my inner thoughts racing as I stared at the blank page.
Rather, as demonstrated in this study, many of the CACs refer to a historical actor's internal mind, something probably not known to too many authors.
According to this definition, intention can be described as a relationship between some object (primarily physical such as an artifact) and an actor's internal mind state - desire, belief, goal, purpose, etc. Intentionalitya is thus "the character of one thing being "of" or "about" something else, for instance by representing it, describing it, refereeing to it, aiming at it, and so on" [ibid].
So if we set aside the controversy over the subject matter of psychology (behavior or the internal mind?), and the controversy over the right explanatory constructs (schedules of reinforcement or cognitive processes?), we find that Behaviorism is actually committed to innateness claims, and doctrinally opposed to any kind of 'blank-slate-ism'.
As for my own internal mind state, I felt but a micro-dose from the Sigurberry I consumed, which by design promised a potency sufficiently low to allow a reasonable person to actually eat an entire gumdrop (or two?!) without blasting off into a full-blown mystical experience.
I am not saying that it would have had an appendage for cutting the glass but rather an internal mind set that would say "it is ok to slow down and redirect, crawl threw the hole in the screen or walk right past that cheap, plastic mini blind platform.
Zhang has introduced the concept of a "distributed cognitive task": a task requiring that information distributed across both the internal mind and the external environment is processed [ 114].
I must get sex reassignment surgery (a "sex change operation") in order to match my external body with my internal mind.
There has been some discussion over the meaning of Brentano's expression 'intentional inexistence.' Did Brentano mean that the objects onto which the mind is directed are internal to the mind itself (in-exist in the mind)?
Joining these are the rapidly advancing neurotechnologies of internal surveillance – reading minds and intentions through brain scanning and potentially intervening in them through transcranial magnetic stimulation.
The real tension is mostly internal, in the minds of the still-uncertain.
