As noted in the previous subsection, the theory of group agency including the issue of whether collective entities can count as subjects of intentional states poses questions about the ontological status of groups and group agents, and it invites reiterations of familiar discussions about reduction, supervenience, constitution, and composition (and more).
Forming a hierarchy of high-, medium-, and low-level intentions presupposes that the intentional system in question possesses a highly nuanced comprehension of the operating environment in which other individuals' intentions are formed, as well as relevant details about the other individuals themselves.
The current study is designed to address questions about intentional insulin omission, including the frequency of this behavior and factors hypothesized to be associated with this behavior, in a large sample of patients weighted to be representative of all adult diabetic patients in the U.S. who take insulin.
In the philosophy of action we ask what the facts are in virtue of which a given piece of behavior is an intentional action; in questions about personal identity we ask what the facts are in virtue of which x and y are the same person; in ethics we ask what the facts are in virtue of which a given action is morally right or wrong.
We should distinguish the question of whether the phenomenal can be explained by the intentional from the question of whether the phenomenal is separable from the intentional.
In normal cases of joint intention and shared belief, however, it is not the case that the intentional states in question are had by some group mind over and above the minds of the participating individuals.
The contempt must be deliberate and intentional, and the question addressed to the witness must be pertinent to the inquiry authorized by Congress.
It is only in virtue of its irreducibility that the intentional state in question can be attributed to the participants as a group.
The view that the intentional states in question are the participant individuals', collectively, and not in a distributive sense, however, is in tension with the view that these intentional states of individuals are their own (the Individual Ownership Thesis).
So do we revise our oath to say, "Do no intentional harm?" The question of what constitutes harm has come to the fore recently in a number of ways.
