Sentence examples for intentional intention from inspiring English sources

According to the account on offer, (non-intentional) intention acquisitions are distinct from (intentional) intention formations, in part because the latter is an active expression of an agent's skilled deliberative activity.

Moreover, (intentional) intention formations result from the causal work of a relevant intention, in conjunction with the agent's attentional attunement to relevant features of the deliberative situation.

Von Hildebrand elaborates upon the idea of intentional acts or intention (Intention) as developed in early phenomenology by arguing in The Idea of Moral Action of 1912 (published 1916) that stances or position-takings (Stellungnahmen) are also intentions.

By contrast, (non-intentional) intention acquisitions need not be connected in the same way to intentions to decide what to do, and need not involve attention.

The question is whether such accounts reveal the unity of intentional action, intention for the future, and intention-with-which. McCann's objection concerned the latter.

On his view, an agent decides for a certain reason, and citing that reason explains the decision, just in case, in cognizance of that reason, and in an intrinsically intentional act of intention formation, the agent forms an intention the content of which reflects the very goals presented in that reason.

Pressures of this kind push us towards the second approach, now orthodox in action theory, which aims to explain both intentional action and intention-with-which in terms of intention as a mental state.

Meanwhile, in Austria, Franz Brentano (1838 1917), who taught at the University of Vienna from 1874 to 1895, and Alexius Meinong (1853 1920), who taught at Graz, were developing an empirical psychology and a theory of intentional objects (see intention) that were to have considerable influence upon the new movement of phenomenology.

It is in fact unclear how this dispute affects the project of explaining intentional action through intention as a mental state.

One response is to admit that they may not: there can be intentional action without intention (see Bratman 2000, pp. 51 2).

As we have seen, many take decisions to be momentary intentional actions of intention formation.