Concerned with mental processes, or acts, he revived and modernized the scholastic philosophical theory of "intentional existence," or, as he called it, "immanent objectivity"; in psychical phenomena, he held, there is a "direction of the mind to an object" (e.g., one sees something).
In fact — and here we return to conceptualism — on the basis of what Auriol has said, we can deduce that every particular thing, e.g. Socrates, has several potential intentional existences: one for each of Socrates' rationes, those basic units of intellectual acquaintance that direct the mind to form certain concepts of him.
Four first-degree parent progeny relationships were discovered among the hermaphroditic powdery mildew resistant cultivars, supporting the existence of intentional grape breeding efforts.
An underlying presupposition of Symbolic Interactionism is the existence of intentional actors who stand in relationship with other actors and choose means to achieve their aims.
The set of extranuclear properties involve intentional properties, modal properties and existence.
Literary works and the characters and objects represented in them were to provide examples of purely intentional objects — objects owing their existence and essence to consciousness.
Here no existential judgment is implied; what is expressed is an intentional note, independent of its existence, which necessarily accompanies it (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 31, 1 9).
Accordingly, in Quodlibet III, q. 1 he argues at length against Henry's application of the intentional distinction to essence and existence Wippel, 1981, 85 88).
Although Meinong admits non-existent objects, he claims that existing in a representation (something like Brentano's phenomenal, intentional "inexistence" of an object) is not existence at all; it is at most "pseudo-existence" (1899, §2, 186 [142]; 1906, §10, 54 57).
A general content is one whose ability to be the content of any intentional state is not dependent on the existence of any particular object.
In the light of other texts by Brentano from the same period they argue that he distinguishes between intentional correlate and object, and that the existence of the latter does not depend on our being directed towards it.
