Sentence examples for intentional attitudes from inspiring English sources
"intentional attitudes" is correct and usable in written English
You can use it to describe the attitudes of people who have thoughtfully and deliberately chosen to act a certain way. For example, "The group of students approached their volunteer project with intentional attitudes of joy and kindness."
Basic modes are the modes of conative or practical intentional attitudes (such as intentions or desires), cognitive or theoretical intentional attitudes (such as beliefs or perceptions), and affective or emotional attitudes (such as hopes and fears).
The merits of Bratman's approach clearly lie in its highlighting that whatever joint intentions are, they do involve interrelated intentional attitudes on the part of the individual agents involved.
Remember that Sellars develops the idea of we-intention with an eye on making the intuition that normative judgments express intentional attitudes compatible with the view that they involve a claim to intersubjective validity.
This entails that groups can be genuine agents and subjects of intentional attitudes.
But how can intentional attitudes be shared in more than a merely distributive sense?
This reference to authorship apparently implicates the intentional attitudes of individuals within the legal system.
According to Ginsborg, a primitively normative attitude is an intentional attitude, a judgment even –– thus preventing her account of meaning (and content) determination from being fully reductive in the naturalistic sense (2011a, 252).
The content of an intentional attitude is whatever the attitude in question is about (e.g., the content of the intention to visit the Taj Mahal is to visit the Taj Mahal).
From his analysis emerges the view that when people share an attitude, it is not the case that each participant has an attitude of his or her own, but that the intentional attitude at stake here is really one and the same, so that many minds are in a numerically identical state.
Here again the crucial questions and the structure is familiar from the discussion of the other two issues of collectivity are whether what one wants to call the subject of an intentional attitude is irreducible, whether reference to such collective subjects is merely metaphorical, or whether this particular kind of subjecthood is such that it can be instantiated by two or more agents jointly.
In three experiments, we evaluated remembering and intentional forgetting of attitude statements that were either congruent or incongruent with participants' own political attitudes.
