Sentence examples for intensity of monitoring from inspiring English sources

Critical illness increases the opportunity for clinical error [ 22, 23], and this is related at least in part to the complexity of diseases, the multiplicity of therapies, frequent invasive interventions and, within the intensive care unit (ICU), the intensity of monitoring and observation, which may paradoxically increase the apparent error rate in this environment simply by improved detection.

Assessing the severity of AECOPD is mandatory to guide decisions of orientation as well as intensity of monitoring treatment and follow-up during and after the acute episode.

We found a significant difference in producer detection rates between study sites, likely due to differences in the intensity of monitoring cattle between sites.

There has been some experimentation with the terms of unemployment compensation to further promote reemployment including the use of reemployment bonuses, variation in the intensity of monitoring job search, and the provision of job search assistance and self-employment assistance.

This category would be for SAEs in which the RSA Committee would require increased frequency or intensity of monitoring.

Additional well-designed clinical studies are needed to determine the optimal intensity of monitoring and treatment of women with GDM diagnosed by the new criteria (that would not have met the prior definition of GDM).

11 This has important implications as current guideline-driven care pathways emphasise different intensities of monitoring and drug prescribing according to CKD stage.

Other data requested will include measurement methodology, length of follow-up, cointerventions, baseline demographic (age, gender) and psychosocial factors (deprivation, quality of life), setting, intensity of self-monitoring, self-monitored blood pressure, comorbidities, lifestyle factors (weight, smoking) and presence or not of antihypertensive treatment.

In general, the intensity of both monitoring and performance-based compensation can be non-monotonic functions of the quality of past performance.

We construct an index of the intensity of outside monitoring based on three variables: subordinated debt rating, non performing loan ratio and examination rating assigned by regulators.

Analyses in this setup produces two predictions: (1) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation decreases with the leverage ratio; and (2) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation increases with the intensity of outside monitoring on the firm's risk choice.