With today's deadly strike against the American consulate in Karachi, the prediction of Pakistani intelligence appears to have materialized.
Mr. Schmidt cited the so-called "Flynn effect," which notes that human intelligence appears to have risen on a sustained basis for several decades, possibly because people now live in more stimulating environments.
For instance, Dr. Rangwala said, a section on the Mukhabarat, the Iraqi directorate of general intelligence, appeared to have been lifted verbatim from Mr. Marashi's article, except for a few tweaks.
In one crucial area, the British intelligence services appear to have relied on faulty sources to independently harden their assessments in September 2002, when they reported that "recent intelligence indicates that production of chemical and biological weapons is taking place" in Iraq.
Nonetheless, the administration and intelligence community appear to have made important mistakes in the weeks before the attacks.
It seems unlikely that there were only two operations, given how extraordinarily close MI6 and Gaddafi's intelligence services appear to have become, but no further details have yet emerged.
At least some American intelligence analysts appear to have shared their British colleagues' opinion that Iraq represented a significant but manageable threat, and that the U.N.'s economic sanctions were curtailing Saddam's weapons programs.
It said MI6 officers were informed they were under no obligation to report breaches of the Geneva conventions; intelligence officers appear to have taken advantage of the abuse of detainees; and Straw, as foreign secretary, had suggested that the law might be amended to allow suspects to be rendered to the UK.
