Thus, although schemas are abstracted on the basis of multiple instances, we argue that at least a 'summary representation' of the perceptual features has to exist.
For instance, "We thus argue that human rationality, and the coherence of human thought, is defined not by logic, but by probability".
Here, limitations to the approach and the overall methodology to understand the complex socio-spatial relationships of cities become apparent, and the benefits of expanding the analysis to include, for instance, agent-based modeling is, we argue, clear.
We argue that instance-based learning satisfies the conditions for intuitive decision-making described in Kahneman and Klein (2009), separates automatic from deliberative processes, and provides a general mechanism for the study of intuitive decision-making.
We argue that instances where the outcome of hypothesis tests using each of these three methods are discordant may reveal important aspects of the data that could not be perceived by using any one method exclusively.
For instance, I argue that we should violate the privacy of a mother if this allows us to save the life of a baby (this entails informing her -- and the health care personnel -- that she is HIV-positive, and hence ought not to breast-feed the baby and give it AZT).
For instance, legislators argue that China manipulates its currency to gain an unfair advantage in trade.
It is hard, for instance, to argue that public interest dictates publishing the blueprints for an atom bomb.
For instance, (3) argue that manually curating and fulfilling some genomic resources may take decades to be completed.
For instance, when Harris argued we should "profile Muslims, or anyone who looks like he or she could conceivably be Muslim"—people were like, Yeah, that looks pretty racist.
