This finding forces a rejection of the hypothesis that tamarins are equipped with an experience-independent, innate representation of tools.
More plausible would be the supposition that the different groups' choice of the rule was driven by something internal to speakers, such as, perhaps, an innate representation of UG.
Of course, since not everyone ends up speaking the same language, these innate representations must allow for some variation.
A problem with this hypothesis, however, is that it is unclear how a language faculty containing innate representations of UG might have arisen in the human mind.
Sterelny (1990) describes his teleological theory as "modest" because it only attempts to give an account of innate representations and he assumes these to be a relatively small subset of the complete set of our mental representations.
My aim here has been to sketch the ways in which modern understanding of the mind reveals the inadequacy and implausibility of the claim that humans have innate representations of UG that are responsible for their acquisition of language.
Others, however, argue that such phantom limbs do not prove the existence of an innate body representation, but could instead arise from learning through observation [see 14].
By the end of the 1960s, however, the discovery of phantom limbs in a few individuals born without the limb (amelics) was cited as evidence for the existence of an innate body schema representation in the brain [e.g. 8].
There is a sharp divide in the corresponding developmental literature: many argue that the innate analog magnitude representation is a prerequisite of the acquisition of arithmetics; others claim that formal education and numerical enculturation sharpens the analog magnitude representation in children.
According to this hypothesis (Carey 2009; Carey & Spelke 1996; Spelke et al. 1992; Spelke 1998, 2000, 2003), evolution has equipped our species (and other species too) with an innate repertoire of conceptual representations, that is, representations that cannot be reduced to the perceptual primitives favored by the Empiricists or the sensory-motor primitives favored by Piagetians.
Due to the biased representation of innate immune genes on the microarray, a Gene Ontology (GO) analysis was not performed to identify enriched GO terms.
