On the one side, xing differentiates things in terms of coherent patterns of force, providing a basis for individuation, even if what counts as an individual is contextual and provisional.
Insofar as this is the finitude of the individual self, it also implies a logic of individuation where the role of other relative selves is diminished.
For Simondon, crystallization is a paradigm of individuation: a supersaturated solution is metastable; from that pre-individuated field, replete with gradients of density that are only implicit "forms" or "potential functions," individual crystals precipitate out.
He develops his theory of "individuation": that is, how personality develops over time and how an individual is split between the "I" (conscious existence) and the "self" (total personality including the unconscious mind).
Maintaining that individual natures are primarily diverse amounts not to having no theory of individuation, but to accepting a form of haecceitism that, like Adams's, does not involve ontological commitment to the existence of real haecceities as distinct real constituents of things.
James discusses individuation in two places: Quodl.
what individuation conditions would they have?
The first concerns the individuation of actions.
The nature as such cannot explain individuation.
He goes on to note that his favoured interpretation of gauge theories (in terms of non-separable holonomies) is one according to which the fundamental objects are ontologically secondary to structure because the objects of a theory are members of equivalence classes under symmetry transformations and no further individuation of objects is possible.
These include causal structuralism concerning the individuation of properties, mathematical structuralism concerning the nature of mathematical objects, and structuralism about laws and dispositions.
