Sentence examples for incomplete preference from inspiring English sources

However, for each completion of the incomplete preference ordering for each complete ordering that extends the incomplete preference relation the theorem follows.

So if we consider the set of probability functions that are such that some completion of the incomplete preference is represented by that function, then we can consider this set to be representing the beliefs associated with the incomplete preference.

Therefore, in this paper, a series of novel rational decision making models are developed in dealing with the multi-attribute assessment problems, which include incomplete preference information.

An integrated nonlinear programming model is constructed for estimation of the criterion weights and the optimal ranking order of the alternatives under incomplete preference information.

Behind what we perceive as an incomplete preference relation there may be a complete preference relation that we can arrive at through observation, introspection, logical inference, or some other means of discovery.

First, we propose the use of models relying on incomplete preference information, outlining a framework and illustrating it with data from a previous decision analysis for the Chernobyl Project.

Furthermore, they can generate incomplete preferences which are challenging to assess in a consistent way.

Recall the requirement that incomplete preferences be coherently extendible (refer back to Section 1); on this representation, all the probability-utility pairs amount to candidate extensions of the incomplete preferences.

Results from the qualitative interviews suggest that embedding effects arise for varied reasons but might be indicative of incomplete preferences.

But it may also be too strong, since, as Isaac Levi in particular has argued (1986), there is nothing irrational about having incomplete preferences in situations involving uncertainty.

One popular response to incomplete preferences is to claim that, while rational preferences need not satisfy the axioms of a given representation theorem (see section 2.2), it must be possible to extend them so that they satisfy the axioms.