The result is a collage in which intention doesn't necessarily follow thought, and thought abstracts feeling.
Of course an individual's nature determines to some extent what happens, there will be an interplay of causes, probably too complex to disentangle, in which intention usually plays a part; but moments at which a person just says, "I shall now do X" and does it are rare – or so it has been in my life, anyway.
Fourth, (§3.4) one might think, given the ways in which intention is thought to involve belief, that in being instrumentally incoherent, one violates a requirement of theoretical rationality.
They can also accommodate the case in which intention is essential to, and thus not fully distinct from, the action it causes: for things that cannot be done except intentionally, as perhaps greeting and promising (Anscombe 1963, pp. 84 5).
Paul Grice [1971] favored a closely related view in which intention consists in the agent's willing that certain results ensue, combined with the belief that they will ensue as a consequence of the particular willing in question.
Finally, in a PET study by Fink and colleagues[60], which manipulated the congruency between the subjects' intentional movements and their visual sensory outcomes, the right SFC showed increased response to the conflicting situation in which intention and outcome did not match.
It's a story in which intentions are nothing and deeds are everything, in which — for all the near-constant, lively, amiable, and witty chatter — almost nothing is said.
Otherwise we would have evolved a system of communication like the one employed by dogs, in which intentions and meaning are always clear to anyone who wants to pay attention.
For one, it is a will-based ethics in which intentions count for everything and external behavior or actions count for nothing.
More precise estimation of intention habit conflict requires identification of situations or samples in which intentions are expected to shift, or have shifted, away from established habits.
Or in a 'disjunctive' theory according to which intention in action has two irreducible forms: doing A intentionally and 'mere' intending, frustrated by the world?
