Participation in a shared activity allows for unscripted behaviors and natural responses to unexpected events things that rarely show up during business lunches or office meetings, where impressions are managed and presentations are carefully rehearsed.
When a human being interacts with another human being — for example, a friend — we are driven by the desire to take part in a shared activity.
And coming together with the people in your community, planning events, or engaging in a shared activity like gardening can make you feel like you're part of a group that has the same larger goals and values.
Each participant has an intention with respect to the shared activity; each wills it.[9] The Intention Thesis attributes to each individual participant in shared activity an intention pertaining to that activity.
Suppose instead that we avail ourselves of some robust conception of part, so that each participant intends to do his part in shared activity, as such.
She goes so far as to say that the obligations to do one's part are present, even when one's partners in shared activity have coerced one into joining them.
Her talk of plural subject agents is, arguably, best interpreted not as a metaphysical claim, but one about the nature of the special obligations and rights holding between participants in shared activity.
Stroud holds that participants in shared activity have a prerogative a moral permission that can override or mitigate moral obligations had to non-participants (such as that of beneficence).
One cannot solve this problem by inserting the cooperative element into the content of the intention, so that what the agent intends is to do her part in shared activity.
A final common thread in philosophical accounts of friendship is shared activity.
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 show how many children spend time together with family in different shared activities, by countries, gender and age group.
