In case of perception the relation of the sense organ with the object characterised by the property which figures as the qualifier in the perceptual cognition is said to be the virtue.
If we are considering an empirical, singular, immediate representation, we can easily understand that in cases of ordinary perception, we can (e.g).g
What distinguishes the disjunctivist theory is its rejection of a 'common kind claim' the claim that the conscious perceptual experiences that are involved in cases of veridical perception, illusion and hallucination have the same nature.
Of course, in cases of veridical perception, the color and the colored object are not merely intentional contents, because they actually exist, but they are still intentional objects, representata.
But, in cases of normal perception, the only physical things that have the properties that perceptually appear to us are the external objects that the direct realists say we are perceiving; and in cases of illusions and hallucinations, there are no physical things that have the properties that perceptually appear to us.
So we can mark some of the differences between views that fall under the disjunctivist label by invoking the notion of 'disjunctivism about X', where X is the relevant mental feature that it is claimed differs in cases of veridical perception and hallucination.
On this view, in cases of object-perception, the properties expressed by the special semantic entity that is experientially entertained characterizes the way the perceived object appears.
So the naive realist holds, in contrast to both the sense-datum theory and intentionalism (and, adverbialism), that the veridical experiences involved in genuine cases of perception consist, in their nature, of relations to ordinary objects (Level 1).
On most views, these phenomena do not occur in all cases of perception, but still have important ramifications for the epistemology of perception.
This may be the right view of the sensation of secondary qualities the Leibnizian error lies in assimilating all cases of perception to this kind of case, and thereby concluding that perception presents us only with confused ideas.
