But it often means something different: some sort of immaterial subject of consciousness, for instance (as in the phrase 'the myth of the self').
But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial.
The problem for dualism however is in finding the ground of the difference between fearing, believing, hoping etc. i.e. what difference is there to the immaterial substance when a subject is in different mental states?
The subject is an immaterial substance that thinks, acts and feels.
Unlike Hume, he insisted on the existence of an immaterial mind who is the subject of sensations of colour (Essay I.i.1. §6).
Consequently, every complete reality is always a unity of subject and object i.e., an immaterial ideality, a concrete universal.
Second, because the laws of nature only apply to the extended, material substance, the non-extended, immaterial part of human nature the soul is not subject to the laws of nature.
Firstly, when the threat aspect of the throffer is a joke; secondly, when the offer aspect is already so desirable to the subject that the threat does not affect their decision-making; or, thirdly, when the subject mistakenly believes the threat immaterial because of the attractiveness of the offer.
Now one might try to think of these subjects as just bundles of the immaterial states.
A Cartesian dualist holds that mental states are distinct from any physical state of the subject, as they are states of an immaterial thinking substance.
The subject, appropriately enough, seems to be two equally immaterial spheres -- the spirit world and the Internet -- plus the notion that one can get trapped in either.
