We will return in later sections to more general worries about the nature and possibility of imagery representation per se, but we should also ask just how we should understand the notion of a code (as Paivio uses it[1]), and about how such codes are to be differentiated, characterized, and counted.
During mental imagery, visual representations can be evoked in the absence of "bottom-up" sensory input.
Research in the Cognition, Brain, and Behavior (CBB) group includes studies of sensation and perception, learning and memory, attention, mental imagery, conceptual representation, aging, language, emotion, motor control, social cognition, moral decision making, and neurological disorders.
Any abstract idea has an imagery or representation.
In addition, we use web imagery for representation of the results.
Neither family photography nor advertising imagery, the representation oscillates between womanhood and childhood, fantasy and reality.
Perceived/imagined judgments involve differentiating comparable visual imagery-based representations, albeit one kind that was generated internally, and one that was derived from the outside world.
The measures described in the previous sections focus on mental imagery as internal representations that reproduce or simulate the properties of perceptual representations (Pearson, 2007).
This system is designed to create rich imagery, not accurate representations.
The auditory imagery of onomatopoeic representations was compared with the auditory impressions for their corresponding actual sound stimuli, which were obtained in our previous study [7].
