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Table 9 Summary of best selections under JPEG2000 attack for Nash equilibrium solution Image Attack   JPEG 2000 Peppers (7,7),(6,8) Baboon (8,7),(2,1) Splash (6,7),(5,8) Note: The underline means the final selection under multiple equilibrium conditions.

In order to select the suitable values of the gain factor α in Eqs. 5 and 6 that fulfill both the invisibility and the robustness requirements of the watermarking, we plot with respect to α the PSNR of the watermarked images (Fig. 8 a) and the BCR of the extracted watermarks (Fig. 8 b) after a standard image attack (JPEG lossy with quality factor equals to 40).

These two methods are robust to common image attacks; but geometric attacks are still challenges.

Compared to the DWT-based and DCT-based methods, the proposed method is superior in terms of embedding capacity, PSNR and survival to a number of image attacks.

Overall, the experimental results demonstrate that our scheme provides excellent robustness against multiple image attacks such as bit-plan removal, cropping, JPEG compression, histogram equalization, low-pass filtering, and noise adding attacks.

What makes our study original is that we describe and compare the effect of different classes of codes against different type of real image attacks, we include different codes and the list decoding scheme in a color watermarking complete process.

We have described and compared the effect of different classes of codes against different type of real image attacks, we have included different codes and the list decoding scheme in a color watermarking complete process.

The drawbacks are: (1) the architecture is not sensitive to changes in the plain-image; (2) they are insecure upon chosen/known plain-image attack.

The reconstruction of a sufficiently similar feature vector that provides a close biohash to the original one, called a pre-image attack (masquerade attack), is a major threat to the template protection capability of a biometric hashing scheme.

The biohashing method of Ngo et al. is presented as a one-way function [10]; however, we show that this is not the case (in the cryptographic sense) and biometric hashing is not pre-image attack resistant if the secret key that is used for generating a biohash is known to the adversary.

We employed some standard attacks which include color attacks, filtering attacks, noise attacks and image compression attacks.