However, if we construe "a donkey" as an existential quantifier, how does it manage to bind the pronoun across a sentence boundary?
Even if we construe noncognitivism in a mentalistic manner—as a thesis concerning what kind of mental states moral judgments are there is no obvious implication relation.
If we construe assertively uttering a sentence exemplifying 'S is P' as asserting the proposition that A is A, then we fail to capture the point of the assertion.
Rosenthal (1994) complains (against the identity theorist) that experiences have some characteristically mental properties, and that 'We inevitably lose the distinctively mental if we construe these properties as neither physical nor mental'.
If we construe Reid as holding that in the act of perception there are three elements the physiological modification of the organ, a mental sensation and the perception of an object then we can contrast this with Hamilton's position which holds that the mental sensation and the perception are simultaneous and in a sense two sides of the same coin.
But if we construe a liberal democracy minimally, as a political structure that effectively protects a certain schedule of individual rights (to religious freedom, speech, due process, and the like), it is plausible to suppose that exclusive focus on individual rights is itself a betrayal of liberalism.
If we take the subject in this case to be me — all of me — this content might be narrow, while if we construe the subject more narrowly as, say, my brain, then the very same content of the very same state will be broad rather than narrow (since a duplicate state could have a different content if hooked up to a different kind of eye).
The UDDA may appear to support DCD but only if we construe a bifurcated rather than a unitary definition of death that does not require the permanent cessation of the organism as a whole but only of certain parts of it.
If we thus construe Millean causal reasoning as deductive reasoning, all the inferential risks are shifted from the induction rules into the premises such as causal homogeneity, determinism and the principle of universal causality.
What if our own interest, as we construe it, consists of refusing what others want of us?
