Conversely, if there was probability 1 that the other guy is going to choose Right, and I choose Up, then I get 0.
So this isn't so hard, we know that if I choose Up and there's probability 0 that the other guy is going to choose Right, that's the same as saying I choose Up and the other guy chooses, let's try it again.
For it can be shown that, necessarily, C-Fail is true if C-Trans is false, but there are probability distributions that make C-Fail and C-Trans true at the same time for any chosen t ∈ [0, 1).
The thought here is that, even if there is some probability that the story has relative to our evidential base, we may not be able to determine what that probability is, or even any reasonably delimited range in which that probability falls.
If there is any probability at all that an event will happen, then eventually it will.
If there are infinity universes, doesn't that mean that if there is any probability at all of something happening, it will happen an infinite number of times?
Speaking purely theoretically, if there are, in fact, infinity universes (and not just A LOT of them), then if there is any probability at all that something will happen, then it will happen, and it will happen an infinite number of times.
However, even if there is no probability in the MWI, it is possible to explain our illusion of apparent probabilistic events.
Intimately associated species such as vertically transmitted symbionts and their hosts may cospeciate by default due to the mode of transmission, especially if there is low probability for horizontal transfer to a new host species.
In this case, d i and d j are irrelevant, which is denoted as d i ⊀ d j. 4. If there is a probability p to have Δq j > 0, p ∈ (0,1), it means that indicator d j will lead to increment on the metric of d j with probability of p. In this case, d i and d j are not completely related, which is denoted as ( {d}_i overset{sim }{prec } {d}_j ).
