If I assert that $p$ and $q$ is a logical consequence of $p$ (more properly, if this relation holds between the sentences expressing the propositions), then if I commit myself to $p$ I also, in some indirect normative sense, commit myself to $q$, but I don't really assert that $q$ if I am unaware of the consequence relation.
In other words: if I assert that we lack consensus, and several folks come along to say - hear, hear!"- we may leave our audience with the impression that there are thousands more just like us who feel the same.
Suppose I assert, "If the GDP continues to decline, unemployment will rise", but the GDP does not continue to decline, instead holding steady.
But if the afterlife is, as I assert, an eternal recurrence of this life, then the meek must dine in perpetuity on low carbs and broiled chicken with the skin removed.
In her book Woman and the New Race, she wrote: "while there are cases where even the law recognizes an abortion as justifiable if recommended by a physician, I assert that the hundreds of thousands of abortions performed in America each year are a disgrace to civilization".
What I assert then is wrong if I don't have the belief, despite the existence of black swans.
He distinguishes between telling and making an assertion, and argues that in certain cases the implication of my assertion "is sufficiently clear that I can be said to have told you this" (Faulkner 2013, 3102) even if I did not assert this.
In contrast, if I were to assert 'It's cold' to the monolingual Chinese speaker or to the parochial Canadian, my assertion would be defective, since my audience wouldn't be able to figure out which temperatures are ruled out by my assertion.
Thus if he asserts "I am thinking water is scrumptious," he will be aware of relevant alternative interpretations that he cannot rule out from the armchair.
She jutted out her jaw and asserted, "If I don't read, then how do I know whether it's legal mail?" Yep.
