The word "ideational" is correct and usable in written English.
You can use it when you are discussing or referring to ideas, concepts, or theories that have been formulated or created. For example: "My teacher praised me for my ideational creativity when I presented my project in class."
As these examples show, the ideational account ignores the "public" nature of meaning.
In a famous essay in the Mercure de France in 1891, the critic Albert Aurier declared Gauguin to be the leader of a group of Symbolist artists, and he defined his work as "ideational, symbolic, synthetic, subjective, and decorative".
Kierkegaard found Hegel's influence in particular to be baneful and irresponsible; it seemed characteristic of German idealism in its Hegelian form to care more about perfecting lifeless and convoluted ideational systems than about the details of human existence.
Forms of religion based on idealism (a philosophical movement that stressed the spiritual or ideational in the interpretation of experience) abandoned the idea of a transcendent God and identified the divine with wholly immanent attitudes or processes.
But the ideational account of meaning, as Locke's view is sometimes called, is vulnerable to several objections.
The behaviorist account, like the ideational one, is also vulnerable to the objection based on compositionality.
Because the example can be generalized (anyone can associate any idea with any complex expression), it follows that the ideational account is unable to explain the compositionality of natural languages.
The use of graphic and ideational montage demonstrates that some filmmakers purposely flaunt the fabrication involved in motion pictures.
However, his theory has the resources to (a) condemn particular manifestations of bad attitudes, even when they do not have their typically bad direct consequences, (b) immediately ("intrinsically") despise them, (c) judge that such immediate condemnations are warranted, and thereby (d) constitute new, reflective and cognitively loaded affective-ideational-motor attitudes of condemnation.
Desire denotes a reflective, conscious valuing, not a mere "affective-motor" attitude, but an "affective-ideational-motor activity," a "union of prizing and appraising" (TV 218).
The examination of the idea of God follows almost directly upon the introduction of the possible connection between the objective reality of some of his ideas and the formal reality of extra-ideational or extra-mental objects.
