It is '=' that must serve as the I-predicable, and it renders distinct ordered pairs of integers discernible.
Some equivalence relations are defined in terms of the I-predicable of a theory and hence cannot serve as such.
The first thing to notice about this example is that E cannot be the I-predicable of such a theory, since E is defined in terms of identity (look at the right side of R).
Geach's focus at this point is on the need to relativize an I-predicable to a theory T. Geach then immediately saddles the friend of absolute identity with the view that for "real identity" we need not bring in the ideology of a definite theory.
(Any pair of I-predicables for a fixed theory are equivalent).
It is pretty much downhill from there - with a plot so fully predicable that I actually started to nod off a few times, so if anything magnificent happened please contact me and I will make a full retraction.
This makes his logical system considerably different from the Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic systems of the Middle Ages, since for the latter the predicative relation of any sentence of the subject/copula/predicate form had to be understood as modally determined by the particular nature of the predicable corresponding to the predicate (i.e., its species, genus, difference, proprium, accident).
What he says he means by this is that the predicate be truly predicable at some time, in the present tense, of the supposita of the subject.
These passages suggest that the self-predicational nature of Forms implies that the only property predicable of a Form is itself: i.e., Justice is just and the only thing Justice is is just.
In both cases we have a particular that is also a property, a subject of predication that is also a predicable entity, where the predicable entity is predicated of itself.
As a result, the delay or latency for traffic inside the data center, i.e., east-west traffic, is predicable and a non-blocking server-to-server connectivity can be realized [7].
