Thus Marlies Galenkamp holds that a right-holding group has to possess a strong form of intra-group solidarity and has to be the kind of group that communitarians describe as a constitutive community (1993, 81 100, 111 2, 131; see also Segesvary 1995).
But Bush has not, to say the least, abandoned the idea of himself as a member, not to say the undisputed leader, of the authority-holding group in America.
Sometimes the concern is for those inside, and sometimes for those outside, the right-holding group.
Yet her paradigmatic case of a right-holding group is a group distinguished by its common culture (112, 138 71).
Nor, if we adopt the interest theory, need the right-holding group be a group in virtue of anything other than the shared interest that grounds their right.
Thus, vindicating group rights need not entail showing that the right-holding group has either interests or a standing that is not reducible to those of its members.
That is associated with the supposition that, if the shared interest generates a group right, the right-holding group must also be understood as an irreducible moral entity.
The term corporate will be used here to describe the traditional conception, since that conception presents a right-holding group as a unitary entity.
Moreover, that theory does provide a ready-made account of what it is that individuals share interests that makes them a right-holding group.
We might reasonably suppose with Raz (1986, 208) that a right can be a group right only if it is a right to a good that is public to the members of the right-holding group.
