Sentence examples for higher level kinds from inspiring English sources

He argues that it is not that the complexities of any reduction (due to the many-one relations between molecular and higher level kinds) exceed our cognitive capacities.

This sense of one many relations between molecular and higher level kinds does not necessarily preclude some types of reduction, but explanations in molecular biology must to be sensitive to the associated epistemic issues.

Apart from the one-many relation between molecular and higher level kinds, Hull (1972, 1974 , 1976 also points to the existence of a many-one relation as a challenge for reductionism.

Principles of classical genetics (e.g., segregation) are explained by cellular processes (e.g., the behavior of chromosomes in meiosis) because the higher level kinds picked out by cytology are causally relevant.

Elliott Sober (1999) extends this line of argument: an explanation in terms of higher level kinds can be more unified or general by encompassing heterogeneous lower level kinds, but this same heterogeneity exhibits important differences in scientifically interesting properties.

Some critiques of (epistemic) reductionism emphasize that the effects of molecular processes strongly depend on the context in which they occur, so that one molecular kind can correspond to many higher level kinds (Section 4.1).

A prominent and significant challenge to reductionism stems from the fact that higher level biological structures and processes can be realized by different kinds of molecular processes, so that many molecular kinds can correspond to one higher level kind (Section 4.2).

Clapp (2001) and Walter (2006) argued that high-level kinds can be legitimately identified with disjunctive kinds.

Quite unlike eliminativist approaches, explanationist analyses tend to focus on large-scale theories and relatively high-level kinds of evidence.

High-level kinds are multiply realized in virtue of the fact that different physical kinds play the required role in different organisms, systems or contexts.. Thus, if we individuate the high-level kinds in a more fine-grained way, we can save a weaker form of type-identity theory.

Others have argued that Machery's criteria for something's being a natural kind are too restrictive and that his view would have the consequence of ruling out clear cases of legitimate higher-level kinds in science generally (e.g., Gonnerman & Weinberg 2010, Margolis & Laurence 2010).