Although payments for heterogeneous conservation measures have been analysed in the literature, it has never been questioned that payments can be designed in a way that encourages enough land users to carry out each conservation measure within a portfolio of measures.
Indeed, this applicability is particularly limited given that only a few other countries (eg, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, USA) have made progress implementing mental health payment systems, using heterogeneous clustering and resource distribution methodologies.
What a blessing that in one of the most attractive markets for social game developers and social platform providers – Europe – the long-established payment service providers have invested years and years of development in bridging the national gaps to bring a unified payment experience to this heterogeneous market.
In this respect, Eastern Europe is probably the most heterogeneous area in terms of healthcare payment systems, attitude of health policy makers and national income.
The findings may contribute to putting the focus on the potential of extending the new payment system's eligibility and accessibility further among the heterogeneous group of adult PDS patients.
In this framework, conservation payments are intended to cost-effectively target fair market value compensation for heterogeneous land for preservation that sustains ecosystem health.
Specifically, we consider the setting where agents' demands follow heterogeneous distributions and the principal offers a menu of contracts stipulating quantities and transfer payments for each demand distribution.
This ranking emerges because high offers are more common (especially among high value people in the heterogeneous environment) in the uniform price mechanisms, where higher offers only increase the payment when needed for provision.
This paper quantitatively analyses the cost-effectiveness of alternative green payment policies designed to achieve a targeted level of pollution control by heterogeneous microunits.
However, when environmental-service (ES) buyers are heterogeneous in their income and water-consumption levels, this scheme may not be optimal, as total payments might become too low and services under-supplied.
