And what this means is that whatever reason God has for choosing to create one creaturely world over another cannot be found in his gracious love for creatures (For further argument in support of this point see Thomas, 1996).
Furthermore, as I've suggested, if God had no such preference, his gracious love for creatures would give him no reason to select any particular possible world for creation.
Here is Sinclair giving us the opening speech of the charming adulteress, Francesca: O living creature gracious and friendly, who goest through the murky air visiting us who stained the world with blood, if the King of the universe were our friend we would pray to Him for thy peace, since thou hast pity of our evil plight.
Here is Sinclair giving us the opening speech of the charming adulteress, Francesca: **{:.break one} ** O living creature gracious and friendly, who goest through the murky air visiting us who stained the world with blood, if the King of the universe were our friend we would pray to Him for thy peace, since thou hast pity of our evil plight.
Moreover, doing so seems to be entirely consistent with God's gracious love of all creatures, regardless of their merit.
So, if God is not reduced to playing dice with respect to selecting a world to create,there must be some basis for his selection over and beyond his gracious love for all creatures, regardless of merit.
For his gracious love for each and every creature fails to provide a reason to create one creature rather than another, or to create the creatures in one possible world rather than those in another.
Indeed, although God's gracious love extends to every possible creature, it would be odd to suggest that he, therefore, could have no preference for creating a world with such creatures over a world in which creatures use their freedom to abuse others, use their talents to turn good into evil, and devote their lives to selfish ends.
