Immutability follows from God's simplicity.
Swinburne entitles chapter 3 of Is There a God?, "The Simplicity of God".
(See the whole question for Aquinas' detailed arguments for God's simplicity).
If so, what sense can we make of God's simplicity and immutability?
4. At times it is unclear whether Swinburne is claiming the virtue of God's simplicity or that of theism.
The argument from divine perfection, like the argument from God's simplicity, fails because God appears to possess some of his real properties contingently.
We will consider arguments from God's simplicity, from his perfection, from his sovereignty, from his omnipotence, and from his demand for total devotion.
They similarly took a strict view on the question of divine attributes, arguing that God's simplicity ruled out the acceptance of any attributes distinct from God's essence.
Notice, however, that God's simplicity is a second-order property, that is, a property of God's first-order properties such as wisdom, power, goodness, and the like.
For in discussions of God's simplicity, it is routinely noted that God is not intrinsically composite and that He cannot be combined with anything else and that nothing can be combined with Him.
But before doing so let us examine two historically important attempts to show that there can't be two gods because nothing could distinguish them an argument from God's simplicity and another from his perfection.
