Sentence examples for genuine terms from inspiring English sources

He applied contextual definition not just to grammatical particles and the like, but even to some genuine terms, categorematic ones.

However, in a language that treats non rigid expressions as genuine terms, it turns out that neither the classical nor the free logic rules for the quantifiers are acceptable.

If this is to serve as a criterion of ontological commitment, there must be some purely syntactic way of determining which expressions are genuine singular terms; if genuine singular terms are characterized semantically for example, as expressions that refer to objects when they occur in true extensional sentences then the account of ontological commitment goes in a circle.

But recent work (especially Dummett (1973) and Hale (1996)) has given some reason to think that genuine singular terms in English can be recognized syntactically in terms of their inferential role.

As already noted, the Fregean must discover syntactic criteria for identifying genuine singular terms in ordinary language.

And definite descriptions, given Russell's view of definite descriptions, are not genuine referring terms but are instead quantificational expressions.

Yet, given John Buridan's claim that a spoken term cannot be called universal or singular unless it corresponds to a universal or singular concept, we must have singular concepts if we have any genuine singular terms.

It is generally believed that the European countries are more proactive and genuine in terms of ensuring a vibrant HR culture in the South, compared to for example, the United States.

Frege and Russell, by contrast, take the same sentences to demonstrate that those expressions are not genuine singular terms at all and that negative existentials all have a general form, asserting the noninstantiation of a property.

Our example uses the ordinary proper name 'Frida'; but Russell himself thought that such names were not genuine singular terms, and denied that public objects ever got into Russellian contents.

Zoltán Szabó (2001) says, "To be a fictionalist about Fs is to think that our naïve attitude toward F-discourse is only halfway correct: we are right in thinking that we use genuine singular terms that purport to refer to Fs, but wrong in thinking that they actually succeed in referring.