Sentence examples for game rationality from inspiring English sources

If μ* is a strict equilibrium, then one can predict which pure strategy profile the agents in a game will follow given common knowledge of the game, rationality and μ*.

Informational contexts of games can include various forms of attitudes, from the classical knowledge and belief to robust (Stalnaker 1994) and strong (Battigalli & Siniscalchi 2002) belief, each echoing in different notions of game-theoretical rationality.

Hence, distributional preferences affect the degree of standard game-theoretic rationality.

But a main thrust of Deising's work is in articulating the drawbacks resulting from an over-emphasis on the most pervasive form of reason in America, and that behind strategic games and game theory; economic rationality.

They make these predictions based upon their common knowledge of the game and of rationality.

The proposed approach searches for an acceptable and viable solution set over the Pareto Frontier Surface via game theory based rationality constraints.

Thus the repeated duopoly game of bounded rationality by using Eq. (2) is given by q i ( t + 1 ) = q i ( t ) + ν i q i ( a ( 1 − q i ) e − ( q 1 + q 2 ) − c i ).

Assuming that the rules of the game and the rationality of the players are common knowledge, the predicted outcome of the game is that all members of the group choose 0. Since 50 is the largest possible winning choice (if each subject chose 100, half of the group mean would be 50), no rational individual would choose a number more than 50.

As we have seen, given common knowledge of the game and of rationality, forward induction reasoning can lead the agents to an apparent contradiction: The classical argument for backwards induction is predicated on what agents predict they would do at nodes in the tree that are never reached.

However, due to the bounded rationality of game players, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines.

The central result of epistemic game theory is that "rationality and common belief in rationality implies iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies".