The need for third-person empirical data gathered by external observers is perhaps most obvious with regard to the more clearly functional types of consciousness such as access consciousness, but it is required even with regard to phenomenal and qualitative consciousness.
As we shall see, his structural and functional views of consciousness have much in common with those of other authors who argue for wider distributions of consciousness among animals.
Thus, the primary functional purpose of consciousness is to integrate, provide access, and coordinate the functioning of very large numbers of specialized networks that otherwise operate autonomously.
In fact, Gyatso accepts functional descriptions of consciousness but rejects the hypothesis that mind is "reducible to matter,$2$$) since it leaves out the "subjective experience of the individual" -- a stance not uncommon in contemporary philosophy of mind.
This has obvious connections to representational and functional accounts of consciousness that continue to this day.
Combining what Leibniz says here with other similar texts, we see Leibniz articulating a broadly functional account of consciousness.
Cabanac's structural and functional theory of consciousness can be evaluated independently of the evidence that he marshals in support of his view of the distribution and origins of consciousness.
According to the LIDA model and GWT (see Introduction), a major functional role of consciousness is to distribute important perceptual information to different, specialized brain areas.
In anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness, functional connectivity is disturbed while the structural connectivity is preserved.
Outcomes: The primary outcome was a composite of survival time, impaired consciousness, functional status at 3 and 6 months, and neuropsychological status at 6 months; neuropsychological status was assessed by an examiner who was unaware of the protocol assignment.
