Our moral evaluations of persons and their character traits, on Hume's positive view, arise from our sentiments.
The wrongful nature of it might have pushed Grant toward the martyrdom that deflects our attention and shrinks our sentiment from the epic wrong to the particular.
For Smith, the aspiration to be worthy of approval belongs to our sentiments from the beginning, and we have, accordingly, both motivation and reason to change our sentiments if they keep us from this aspiration.
The moral sentiments spring from our capacity to respond sympathetically to others.
These sentiments spring from our moral faculty as naturally as the sensations of sweet and bitter from the faculty of taste" (EAP 5.2, 279).
Jim Veilleux, a 56-year-old computer consultant from Mill Valley, Calif., echoed our own sentiments, telling us that, despite a lifetime of French lessons, "I felt I had to come here to really learn the language".
Hume claims that moral distinctions are not derived from reason but rather from sentiment.
Either moral concepts spring from reason, in which case rationalism is correct, or from sentiment, in which case sentimentalism is correct.
UK planning policy can learn from the sentiment – if not the application – of shanty towns, by supporting house building in some of our most successful cities.
They act as if they are immune from majority sentiment.
