Therefore, one of the alternatives became free physician choice.
Here, the status quo is free physician choice (see Table 1).
Community health workers were asked why participants were so reluctant to take advantage of the opportunity for free physician evaluation.
Thus, a change from free physician choice to such a physician list can be estimated to lower choice probability by 14.7 (=5.9 + 8.7) percentage points.
First, there is resistance against Managed Care-type attributes in both populations, but Germans would have to be compensated more for giving up free physician choice.
So far, few have exercised it; experimental evidence [15] even suggests that the Dutch had positive willingness to pay for a return to free physician choice.
However, this estimate has a standard error (s.e). of 13, indicating that a sizable share of the Swiss population may give up free physician choice for less compensation.
See also [12] for a discussion. 2 This assumption is plainly counterfactual; participants in choice experiments from Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were found to require substantial compensation in particular for giving up free physician choice (see [15, 27]).
Assuming local constancy of the MRS, one can therefore infer that the transition from free physician choice to a physician list would require a compensation of 216 Euro (=79 + 137) annually, compared to 155 Euro (=79 + 76) for the transition to a physician network.
PRSs might be interesting esspecially for countries that do not follow gatekeeper models and therefore have free physician choice (e.g. Germany).
The introduction of these drugs changed the practice of medicine but also stimulated the need for infectious disease experts to clarify their use and help counter the extreme and extensive marketing of these drugs by the pharmaceutical companies in the form of journal advertisements, supplements, and free physician samples.
