Sentence examples for fraudulent misstatement from inspiring English sources

Rule 10b 5(b) imposes primary liability on the "make[r]" of a fraudulent misstatement.

Today, the Court eviscerates this distinction by holding that a person who has not "made" a fraudulent misstatement can nevertheless be primarily liable for it.

Given that, under the majority's rule, administrative acts undertaken in connection with a fraudulent misstatement qualify as "other form[s] of fraud," the majority's supposed preservation of Janus is illusory.

If Lorenzo's conduct here qualifies for primary liability under §10(b) and Rule 10b 5(a) or (c), then virtually any person who assists with the making of a fraudulent misstatement will be primarily liable and thereby subject not only to SEC enforcement, but private lawsuits.

It is undisputed here that Lorenzo was not the maker of the fraudulent misstatements.

Unlike Rule 10b 5(b), none of these provisions pertains specifically to fraudulent misstatements.

Moreover, an ongoing, "egregious" fraud is likely to independently constitute a primary violation of the conduct-based securities laws, wholly apart from the laws prohibiting fraudulent misstatements.

Here, however, the majority does precisely what we declined to do in Janus: impose broad liability for fraudulent misstatements in a way that makes the category of aiders and abettors in these cases "almost nonexistent". 564 U. S., at 143.

The Court attempts to cabin the implications of its holding by highlighting several facts that supposedly would distinguish this case from a case involving a secretary or other person "tangentially involved in disseminat[ing]" fraudulent misstatements.

As construed by the Court, each of these more general laws completely subsumes Rule 10b 5(b) and §17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act in cases involving fraudulent misstatements, even though these provisions specifically govern false statements.

If a person's only role is transmitting fraudulent misstatements at the behest of the statements' maker, the person's conduct would be appropriately assessed as a matter of secondary liability pursuant to provisions like 15 U. S. C. §§77o(b), 78t e), and 78o(b)(4)(E).