There is, therefore, no causal role for substantial form to play and, hence, no need for such forms.
There are interpreters of Aristotle who think that this kind of irreducibility is all that Aristotle means or needs to mean by postulating an explanatory role for substantial form.
In my opinion, the indefinability of particulars makes it impossible for substantial forms to be particulars.
Here Leibniz is right, Kant thinks, and praises him for having shed light on the Aristotelian concept of the entelechy, and Leibniz's recovery of the basis for substantial forms.
In this respect, pneuma plays something of the role of substantial form in Aristotle for this too makes the thing of which it is the form both 'some this,' i.e. an individual, and 'what it is' (Metaph. VII, 17).
For a more detailed discussion of Suárez's treatment of substantial form, see Shields 2012a and 2012b.
(Again, Aristotle's notion of substantial form comes into view).
His argument for the existence of substantial forms is thus effectively abductive: for some range of data or phenomena, Suárez contends, some explanation is required, and the only, or, more weakly, the best, explanation of these phenomena involves a commitment to substantial forms.
The newborn rabbit's behavior is then guided by its rabbit-specific "sensitive soul," which is the name for the substantial form of the rabbit.
First, if we can have no experience of substantial forms, we have reason for doubting their existence.
One substantial form for the corporeality of the body, perhaps one to account for the vegetative activities of the human being, yet another for the animal activities, and then a final one for the intellectual activities of the human being.
